Nuclear Power Reactors 543 irreparable damage to the reputation of the steam automobile. Similar events shaped the outcome of the nuclear reactor competition. First, Hyman Rickover was put in charge of the U.S. naval propulsion program in 1946. His preference for light water was central to most of the history that followed. Second, the explosion of the Soviet nuclear bomb in 1949 caused a civilian power project to be rushed forward, before the physicists involved were ready to make a choice among the available technologies, effectively forcing the choice of light water.
Finally, direct current and the Stanley Steamer technologies and gas graphite and heavy water reactors share one further characteristic. They were all new technologies, competing with other new ones, all operating under dynamic increasing returns.
COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES AND INCREASING RETURNS
Recent theoretical work on competing technologies has focused on situations in which superior technologies can disappear from the market.5 If technologies operate under dynamic increasing returns (often thought of in terms of learning-by-doing or learning-by-using), then early use of one technology can create a snowballing effect by which that technology quickly becomes preferred to others and comes to dominate the market.
Following Arthur, consider a market in which two types of consumers adopt technology sequentially. As a result of dynamic increasing returns arising from learning-by-using, the payoff to adopting a technology is an increasing function of the number of times it has been adopted in the 6 past. Important with regard to which technology is chosen next is how many times each of the technologies has been used in the past. Arthur shows that if the order of adopters is random (that is, the type of the next adopter is not predictable) then with certainty one technology will claim the entire market. He also shows that both technologies have a positive probability of dominating. Thus the market can get locked into an inferior technology.7 5 For a survey of the recent competing technologies literature, see Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies: An Overview," in G. Dosi, et al., eds., Technical Change and Economic Theory (London, 1988) . "Superior" here means "inherently superior." Theoretical results indicate that under a variety of conditions, only one technology will survive in the market. Given this result, the superior technology is that which, if it were to be the surviving one, would maximize net benefits from the technology choice process. This is an ex post definition of "superior. LIGHT WATER, HEAVY WATER, AND GAS GRAPHITE Nuclear reactors are classified by two of the materials used in their construction: the coolant used to transfer heat from the reactor core; and the moderator used to control the energy level of the neutrons in the reactor core. 10 In a light water reactor both coolant and moderator are light water-H20. In a heavy water reactor both are heavy water-D20.11 In a gas graphite reactor the coolant is a gas, usually helium or carbon dioxide, and the moderator is graphite. These three types of reactorlight water, heavy water, and gas graphite-while not the only technologies used or feasible were the most extensively developed as competitors in the nuclear power reactor market.
There has always been doubt as to the superiority, both technical and economic, of the light water reactor.12 It is difficult to document the claim that light water is inferior in an ex post sense-light water may be relatively good now but had a different technology dominated, we would have an even better reactor. Nonetheless, there are indications that this hypothesis is true. In the fifties, following a debate on the relative merits of enriched uranium (light water) and natural uranium (heavy water and gas graphite), the journal Nucleonics stated that "to the observer of this debate it seems that enriched reactors must rely heavily upon their development potential to do much better than match the power costs of natural uranium systems."' 3 Further, the cost estimates made throughout the fifties, detailed later, by no means pointed to light water as the most efficient technology. 10 When an atom is split, neutrons are released which bombard other atoms, causing them to split and so creating a chain reaction. The chain reaction generates considerable heat which is used to turn turbines which generate electricity. To sustain a chain reaction there is an optimal speed, or energy level, for the neutrons. By causing the neutrons to travel through particular substances in the reactor core (moderators), this optimal energy level can be obtained. 
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Cowan Both the gas graphite and heavy water reactors have much lower volumetric power densities (the ratio of power output to core volume) than do light water reactors. While this tends to raise capital costs and reduce design flexibility, it also provides a safety advantage. In the event of a coolant loss, the core will provide a much larger heat sink (particularly in the case of the graphite core) and so the temperature transients will be much smaller, giving operators more time to effect an adequate response. The use of a gas coolant also has the advantage of being safe from phase changes with changes in pressure or temperature. Thus under many fault conditions cooling can be maintained in the gas graphite reactor, when it would be lost with liquid coolant technologies. A second, related advantage of gas coolants is that they can be heated to higher temperatures, which gives the advanced gas graphite reactors a higher thermal efficiency than others.
An element of considerable concern during the British debate over the merits of light water and gas graphite technologies was the steel pressure vessel of the pressurized water reactor (PWR-Westinghouse's light water reactor). The safety principle in the PWR was, and still is, that the vessel never comes close to failure. If a crack does happen to reach the critical size (much smaller than the thickness of the vessel), however, it can grow at speeds up to the speed of sound. There would be no time for reaction. To manufacture a vessel sufficiently free of flaws to be safe from this problem requires very high-technology manufacturing abilities, which are beyond the capabilities of many countries and were beyond most countries in the fifties. Both the Canadian heavy water reactor, the Candu, and the second-generation British gas graphite reactor, the AGR, avoid this problem through systematic redundancy. The Candu uses many pressure tubes rather than a single vessel. The failure of a single tube is not critical and gives warning of other potential failures. This makes Candu less prone to meltdown due to coolant loss. The AGR uses a prestressed concrete pressure vessel. There is considerable mechanical redundancy in the system of steel load-bearing cables. Cables can be replaced individually, and again, the failure of a single cable is not fatal and gives warning of other potential failures.
In terms of operating experience, light water has not been significantly better than the other technologies in spite of having logged many more reactor years-an order of magnitude more than heavy water and three times more than gas graphite. While occupational radiation exposure with light water has been approximately equal to that of heavy water, it has been more than 10 times that of the British gas graphite reactors. The annual load factor of a reactor is the ratio of the total amount of power produced in a year to the amount it would have produced had it operated at full capacity, never shutting down, throughout the year. This is the standard measure of reactor availability. 
INCREASING RETURNS IN NUCLEAR POWER
"For a range of products involving complex, interdependent components or materials that will be subject to varied or prolonged stress in extreme environments, the outcome of the interaction of these parts Cowan cannot be precisely predicted."20 For these products, Nathan Rosenberg argues, learning-by-using is very important. Nuclear power reactors certainly fall into this class of products. When introduced, the technology was very complex and unlike any then in use. The consensus in the 1950s and 1960s was that learning-by-using would be very important.
The feeling that costs of nuclear power would fall with experience is evident throughout the proceedings of the 1955 and 1958 conferences on the Peaceful Uses of the Atom. Christopher Hinton, one of the British delegates, noted that it "is common experience that the cost of prime movers [primary power sources] falls with the passage of time and growth of techniques." He gave details of the dramatic capital cost reductions experienced by land-based oil engines and by steam engines and remarked: "I am quite certain that in nuclear power that same pattern will be followed.'2 ' This spirit pervaded the proceedings of those two conferences.
In a 1962 study the AEC claimed that the cost of electricity generated by light water reactors had fallen from 50 mills per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to less than 10 mills per kWh between 1958 and 1962.22 Even critics of the cost estimates for nuclear power accepted the belief "that 'learning effects' would help reduce costs in the early years of nuclear plant construction."23 The four reactor units installed at the Pickering generating station provide evidence. For the first unit the time elapsed between going critical and generating full power was 91 days. For the second unit this time was cut to 53 days; the third and fourth units were 18 and 12 days, respectively.24 As the designs of these units were virtually identical it seems appropriate to ascribe this improvement to learning.
A simple examination of generating-cost data would not provide evidence of learning. While one would expect learning to drive costs down over time, there are several factors which have applied upward pressure. The early generating stations were sold on a turnkey basis, which amounted to a very large discount on the capital cost for the 20 Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics (Cambridge, 1982), p.
122.
21 Hinton also added: "Let us remember that the first movement onward from the Bolton and Watt engine was really made by Trevithick when he built his high-pressure steam engine on the Thames, with its cast iron boiler which blew up, killed eight men, nearly ruined him and set back the development of the steam engine by a great many years. We must make certain that we do not There is a form of increasing returns from learning common to any technology competing in the research and development stage of a product's life. In the presence of discounting, a technology that is marketable earlier is of more value than one that takes longer to bring to the market. Thus simply working on a technology increases its value by bringing its completion date closer and increases the incentive to do further work on that technology. This was a factor in the dominance of light water.
It is occasionally suggested that network externalities are also important in nuclear power. The network in this case has to do with information. Information about operating performance, appropriate accident response, and safety regulations can be passed among users of the same technology. This was seen (at least in retrospect) as a key factor in the explanation of the Belgian and Swedish decisions to adopt light water: "The best counter measure against technical problems is to have a production system which is common all over the world. . . . 30 Nuclear reactor technology presents a case of a technology subject to strong increasing returns and early uncertainty about the level of its payoffs. There were, and still are, dynamic increasing returns, largely learning economies, particularly in the research and development and early commercialization stages of the technology.31 Economic theory suggests that the history of this technology will exhibit several characteristics: a tendency for the market to lock in to one of the technologies, not necessarily the best one; early tilting of the process toward one of the technologies (this tilting may be caused by events, which at the time did not appear to be crucial to the coming history); and finally, early inability to see (without the benefit of hindsight) which of the technologies will eventually dominate. The first reactor built under the auspices of Euratom was at Garigliano, Italy, and initially both British gas graphite and light water designs were considered. The choice of light water was another serious challenge to the view that gas graphite was the more advanced technol- Before the Euratom accord the European reactor story was English and French. Technology choice for both countries was, to a large extent, influenced by military considerations. The refusal of the United States to share uranium enrichment technology forced both France and the United Kingdom to pursue natural uranium technologies. Both countries felt the need to develop an atomic bomb, and both, through the Manhattan Project, had had experience with gas graphite. This was the obvious initial choice for their civilian power programs.
The only first-generation reactor pursued by the Commisariat a l'Energie Atomique was gas graphite. As nuclear power began to be commercialized in the 1960s, French industry and the Electricite de France (EdF) raised concerns over export possibilities. As remarked earlier, network externalities were thought to be important in the reactor market. One of the concerns of a reactor importer is to be part of a large information network and so it prefers to import a commonly used technology. For good reason, the EdF feared that if France became technologically isolated, the potential export market would rapidly disappear. In addition, the Garigliano decision and the U.S. bandwagon market were both seen as evidence supporting the view that light water was economically superior to gas graphite. A third economic issue was that the relative costs of fuel had been changed by the U.S.-Euratom accord. Enriched uranium was now available and at subsidized prices. Thus the fueling costs of light water reactors (which needed enriched uranium) relative to gas graphite reactors (which used natural uranium) was significantly improved. The light water arm of the multiarmed bandit appeared, judging by the actions of others, to be having very good results. These considerations were countered by the desire to retain an indigenous technology, something favored by French President Charles de Gaulle. When he died, however, the tide turned, and in 1969 the government announced that France would no longer pursue the gas graphite technology. When France joined Euratom in 1957 it had hoped to have the French technology adopted as the European standard. This did not happen, and the French nuclear program, one of the most successful in the world, is based almost entirely on light water technology.
The history of nuclear power in the United Kingdom looks very much like a multiarmed bandit, as first one technology and then another was tried and discarded, occasionally being picked up again later. For reasons similar to those relevant in France, there was an early commitment to Magnox, a gas graphite reactor, for the first generation. For the next generation three technologies were actively considered in the late 1950s-heavy water, gas graphite, and breeder reactors. Significantly, as part of the early decision to concentrate on Magnox, plans to build a prototype heavy water reactor in 1953 were shelved. Early results with Magnox were good, however, and so the high-temperature gas reactor (HTR) was given high priority. In 1959, though, the HTR was shunted aside to make room for the advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR), which was seen as technologically intermediate between Magnox and the HTR. To develop the HTR an international project, Dragon, funded by the United Kingdom, Euratom, and other European countries, was organized in 1959.
For the first reactors of the second generation gas graphite was again chosen in 1965. Heavy water was not yet sufficiently developed, no doubt due in part to the 1953 decision, and light water was thought inferior in terms of safety and long-run development potential. The second-generation gas graphite reactors, the AGR, suffered serious failures. This version of the gas graphite technology was much more expensive than had been anticipated, and the problems of scaling up a 32 megawatt (MW) prototype plant to a full-scale 600 MW generating station proved more difficult than was expected. This resulted in a shift away from gas graphite to heavy water, at least until more advanced technologies appeared. But the decision in 1974 to make this shift for the short run, by creating a large demand for resources to develop the heavy water reactor (SGHWR), effectively ended the long-run prospects of the HTR. "Thus the HTR, the one reactor favored by virtually everybody in the early seventies, was the one decisive casualty of the 1974 decision."39 The problems of the British heavy water reactor seem to have been generated by lack of experience.40 Research on this technology had for two decades been shunted aside in favor of work on the gas graphite technology. This hurt its prospects but to make matters worse, light water had been the subject of massive amounts of research and development over those two decades. When the time came for the United Kingdom to move away from the trouble-plagued AGR, there were two options: heavy water, which would need considerable devel-Cowan opment before it was ready for commercial use, and light water, which could be used immediately.41 Finally, in 1977 light water was chosen.42
Canada has pursued a single technology, namely heavy water, throughout its nuclear program. There was no desire for nuclear weapons, there was an abundant supply of hydroelectric power, and the security concerns of the United States were not present in Canada. These three factors allowed Canada to proceed at a slower pace, while other countries were forced to adopt strategies which would produce nuclear technology quickly. At the beginning of the bandwagon market in 1962, five years after Shippingport, the first commercial heavy water reactor was brought on line. As a small, 22 MW reactor, it was a prototype rather than a serious competitor in the power reactor market. The first full-scale heavy water reactor, a 206 MW Candu brought on line in January 1967, was only the fourth commercial heavy water reactor in the world. (All of the others were designed to produce less than 55 MW.) By this time there were 10 commercial light water reactors in service, four of which were greater than 100 MW. The second nonprototype heavy water reactor was brought on line in April 1972.43 By this time there were 27 full-size light water reactors in commercial use outside Canada. Though heavy water is the only technology used in Canada and has been exported, mostly to middleincome countries, it has not been a large presence on the world market. In this it exhibits the problems associated with a late entrant in an increasing returns process.
During the late forties the primary concerns of the U.S. AEC were military. All branches of the armed services were interested in nuclear energy, and their projects were being undertaken at several different national laboratories. The high priority given to military tasks meant that there were few resources available for the study of civilian power reactors. In April 1951 Lawrence Hafstad, the AEC director of Reactor Development, wrote that "the cost of a nuclear power plant is essentially unknown. We have never designed, much less built and operated, a reactor intended to deliver significant amounts of power economically."44 In this aspect, early developments in nuclear power resemble the early stages of a multiarmed bandit-many arms seem feasible, very 41 Ironically, recent experience with the AGR has been very good. In terms of reliability and availability, it has looked better than other technologies since the mid-1980s. 42 This decision was reconsidered in the 1980s but was not in the end changed. 43 In 1964 little is known about the payoffs of any of them, and resources are devoted to reducing this uncertainty. During the forties and early fifties the AEC was engaged in several reactor projects. While GE's intermediate breeder reactor was the only project aimed specifically at civilian power, four of the technologies under study were important to its future development.45 In the early fifties, though, the demands of the military were gradually being met, and the AEC began to evaluate the economic prospects of various reactor technologies. This went on throughout the decade. One of the first analyses was made by a group of firms, between 1951 and 1953, on the basis of which the AEC chose four technologies for further development.46 These industry teams concluded that economically competitive nuclear electricity was a long way off, but that given the state of development of the various reactor types, the light water reactor promised the cheapest electricity.47
Cost estimates presented at the first Geneva conference in 1955, however, told a different story. Using data presented at this conference J. A. Lane made cost estimates for various reactor types, under uniform assumptions about prices and operating conditions.48 He concluded, using the lower bound of his range of estimates, that by far the cheapest electricity, 4.7 mills per kWh, would be produced by gas graphite reactors. The next cheapest, 6.3 mills per kWh, would come from the aqueous homogeneous reactor, although that reactor posed many technical problems, particularly when compared to gas graphite. Water reactors, both heavy and light, were expected to be relatively expensive. The lowest cost estimate for a light water reactor was 14.7 mills per kWh.49
Because the AEC was prohibited from building and operating fullscale power plants by itself it was committed to involving industry in the development of nuclear energy and in September 1955 issued an invitation to industry to build demonstration power plants. In response 558 Cowan seven proposals were submitted, each suggesting a different reactor type.50 Clearly there was no consensus about which type of reactor was best.
In 1957 Project Size-Up was commissioned. One of the goals of Project Size-Up was to compare the light water reactor at Shippingport, the first nuclear generating station in the United States, with Calder Hall, the gas graphite reactor which had gone on line in the United Kingdom a year earlier. The study found that if both had been built in the United Kingdom, the gas graphite reactor would have produced electricity at a significantly lower cost than would a light water plant (8.0 mills per kWh as opposed to 13.1 mills). In the United States, however, gas graphite would still have been less expensive but the difference was considerably less pronounced (17.9 versus 19.6 mills per kWh).
At the same time, a formal debate was sponsored by the journal Nucleonics about the relative merits of enriched and natural uranium reactors.51 The conclusion of the debate was that it was by no means clear that enriched uranium reactors, which the AEC was heavily backing, were inherently superior to natural uranium reactors. It appeared "that of the design concepts conceived so far, none makes an economic advantage for the enriched uranium reactor a foregone conclusion."52 Throughout the fifties comparisons of the various reactor types were continually being made, based both on engineering studies and on the performance of the few existing plants. By no means, however, had they found the light water technology superior to other technologies. Indeed, in 1954 Alvin Weinberg declared that "the choice of water cooling and moderation for PWR [the Shippingport reactor] was dictated by the requirement that the reactor demonstrate reliable nuclear power rather than cheap nuclear power."53 Interestingly, he suggested that possible improvements on the Shippingport design (made possible by learningby-using) include using heavy water instead of light water as coolant and moderator. Many arms of the multiarmed bandit were examined during the fifties, but there was no consensus as to their relative merits. Nonetheless, one arm-light water-was adopted by a major player, the U.S. Navy. 50 The types were liquid-metal-cooled, heavy water moderated; gas graphite; graphite moderated, liquid-metal fuel; homogeneous; two variants of light water; and an organic hydrocarbon cooled and moderated reactor. The duration of underwater operation of conventional submarines is severely limited because they are forced to run on batteries when submerged. By the end of World War 11 the U.S. Navy was concerned with this problem and saw nuclear propulsion as a possible solution.54 Captain Hyman Rickover, in charge of the navy's new nuclear propulsion program, wanted to produce a nuclear submarine as quickly as possible.
In Rickover we see one of Jonathan Hughes's vital few, someone who was crucial to the development of an innovation.55 To a very great extent his was the voice that mattered when it came to technical decisions within the navy's propulsion program. His commitment to pursue nuclear submarines meant that nuclear power technology (in addition to nuclear weapons) would be developed quickly after the war. His preference for light water caused it to be the only technology available when a civilian power reactor was demanded immediately in 1949 by "national security." By pulling General Electric into light water technology he effectively prevented the company from developing any other technology and set the stage for its battle with Westinghouse. In effect, the history of nuclear power in the United States follows on the work of Rickover in the 1940s and 1950s. His contribution came at a crucial time. Before anyone else was prepared to make a commitment to any particular technology, he did. He forced his project to be successful and in so doing gave a sufficient lead to light water. The backers of light water power reactors were able to use this advance along the learning curve and the dynamic increasing returns inherent in the technology to capture the market.
After spending several months at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1946, Rickover was convinced that enough was known to build a prototype reactor. He felt that light water was the technology he wanted, but in 1946 there was certainly no consensus among the physicists that it was the best. They felt that much more study was needed before a sensible choice could be made. Harold Etherington, head of the Naval Reactor Division at the Argonne National Laboratory, was still conducting studies of six reactor types in 1949. His preliminary study of light water (the first that he completed) indicated that there were no insurmountable problems in using this technology for 5 There are two other technologies that overcome this problem. One is the closed cycle submarine, in which diesel exhaust gas is recycled and mixed with oxygen which has been stored in cylinders, and then re-used. The second is a snorkel submarine, in which air for combustion while the submarine is submerged is obtained from a snorkel arrangement which trails the submarine on the surface. After the war, the U.S. Navy was working on all three of these technologies, only one of which has survived. 
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Cowan submarine propulsion.56 Rickover, too, was aware that many technologies were feasible and had arranged to have several laboratories working on various aspects of gas-cooled, liquid-metal-cooled, and sodium-cooled systems, in addition to the Westinghouse work on light water. Diversity notwithstanding, Rickover was determined to build a reactor as quickly as possible. To this end he got a letter from a reluctant Walter Zinn, the director of the Argonne laboratory, stating that on the basis of existing knowledge, light water seemed to be the most promising. This was enough for Rickover. He was able to get approval for Westinghouse to build a prototype submarine reactor on land.
This prototype, known as the Mark I, was tested in early 1953, and its successor, the Mark II, was installed in the submarine Nautilus. The Nautilus was launched in early 1954 and had no major problems in its sea trials. Performance of the first two nuclear reactors made the light water arm of the multiarmed bandit look very good.
During the time that Westinghouse was working on the Mark I and Mark 11, technical problems had forced General Electric to abandon its civilian reactor project and turn its energies to its own naval reactor, the Mark A, a liquid-metal-cooled, beryllium-moderated reactor. The Mark A was successfully tested in June 1955, but as it continued to be used, problems developed. The second nuclear submarine, the Seawolf, was launched in July 1956 with the GE Mark B as its propulsion unit. Problems with this reactor were so severe, however, that late in 1956 Rickover had it removed from the ship and replaced with a Westinghouse light water reactor.
The competition with regard to submarine reactors was over. The initial competition took place on paper as Etherington and others studied the feasibility of various coolants. Rickover decided in favor of light water. In the second competition between actual working reactors, the problems with the Mark B caused Rickover to decide against liquid metal for submarines. This decision effectively spelled the end for liquid-metal-cooled reactors.
This was not the end for General Electric in the reactor business, however. While working on the Mark A and Mark B, the company had also been developing the submarine advanced reactor-a light water reactor. Despite problems with this reactor and the feeling that the work could have been done much more quickly by Westinghouse, Rickover kept the project alive. One of his chief motives was to bring GE into competition with Westinghouse in light water technology. Although this reactor was never extensively used as a propulsion unit, it did provide GE with the experience necessary to enter the civilian market with the light water technology.57
While the work on submarine reactors was going on, the navy was also considering the feasibility of nuclear-powered surface ships. The need was less severe than for submarines, but it was felt that a nuclear-powered surface ship would be faster and could stay at sea longer than a conventional ship. The work focused on developing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Westinghouse had been doing initial work on six different coolants for this reactor, but once again Rickover favored the light water technology.
Since the early 1950s interest had been expressed in a dual purpose reactor-one which would be a prototype for both a large shipboard plant and for a power reactor. Rickover had, until 1954 at least, been successful in vetoing that idea. But throughout this time two things were happening. The utilities were beginning to show interest in acquiring nuclear power, and the Soviet nuclear program was seen as more and more of a threat to U.S. national interests. In 1952 the AEC had moved civilian power from last to first priority and by 1953 was making plans to build a power reactor jointly with industry.58 The carrier reactor project had been put on the shelf, for the time being at least, in order to provide funds for the civilian project. Two approaches were available to the AEC for the power reactor. The first was to adopt Rickover's suggestion to transform the carrier reactor into the civilian reactor, with few if any major changes.59 This would have produced a reliable reactor quickly but would not have provided cheap electricity.60 The other approach was to take more time and to explore further the work that had been done at the Argonne National Laboratory on light and heavy water moderators and coolants. It was thought that this approach would be far more likely to generate electricity that would be competitive with conventional sources. Hafstad favored the latter approach and was supported by his staff, but Rickover prevailed. The civilian reactor, "now called the pressurized-water reactor, would follow the carrier reactor design and ... it would be assigned to the naval reactors branch....",61 This battle was won so handily by Rickover that while still an active naval officer, he was put in charge of the construction of the first nuclear generating station in the United States. Needless to say, the technology used was light water. In the 1940s and early 1950s the AEC had advocated a cautious approach to civilian nuclear power, arguing that much laboratory work was needed before a sensible decision could be made about which technology was best suited for civilian use. It was forced to make an early decision, however, by the National Security Council.
After World War II the United States believed that if it kept its nuclear knowledge secret, it would enjoy a 20-year monopoly in nuclear technology. This it did, refusing to share either uranium enrichment or reactor technology with its wartime allies. U.S. secrecy explains in part why nuclear programs in the rest of the world focused on natural as opposed to enriched uranium reactors. Under the Atoms For Peace program this changed-the United States was willing to guarantee supplies of enriched uranium and provide other reactor technology. This change, it seems, was brought about by the Soviet nuclear weapon test. In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb and exploded as well the U.S. dream of a monopoly in nuclear technology. In 1953 the United Kingdom exploded an atomic weapon. There was also evidence that both of these countries were developing civilian power capabilities. It is necessary to remember that in the late forties and early fifties there was a tremendous faith that nuclear energy could do much good, for example providing inexpensive power to the Third World that would facilitate economic growth. This possibility, combined with the apparent prowess of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the nuclear power field, caused great alarm in the United States. There was a fear that if the world perceived the Soviets to be winning the race for nuclear energy (which the United States had not yet seriously entered), it would draw nonaligned nations, particularly Third World countries, into the Soviet camp. This would do no end of damage to U.S. interests. AEC Commissioner T. Murray stated: "Once we become fully conscious of the possibility that power-hungry [that is, energy scarce] nations will gravitate towards the USSR if it wins the nuclear power race, it will be quite clear that this race is no Everest-climbing, kudos-providing contest."63 Indeed, Murray thought that permitting the Soviet Union to be first in the race to civilian power would do more damage to U.S. interests than had the Soviet atomic bomb.
Suddenly a new priority had been forced on the AEC. The National Security Council had decided that a strong civilian reactor program was vital to national interests and that it was imperative to get the program going. To this end the Shippingport generating station was built with the idea "to prove American nuclear superiority, not to lower energy costs."64 Any reactor would do, as long as it was known to be reliable. Clearly the obvious choice was the light water reactor, with which there had been the most experience.
While fear of Soviet superiority led to the choice of the light water reactor for the Shippingport plant, it also led to the desire to have U.S. technology spread throughout the world. As pointed out in reference to Euratom, this resulted in enormous subsidies to Europe to encourage the adoption of American technology. Learning-by-doing was very important in the early stages of the industry, and Europe provided a location in which this learning could take place. If enough plants could be built quickly, U.S. technology would improve rapidly and become the standard for the first generation, until more advanced reactorsbreeders or high-temperature gas-cooled reactors-could be developed. Unfortunately, this choice "gave the light water model a head start and momentum that others were never able to match and led the industry to base its commercial future on a reactor design that some experts have subsequently suggested was economically and technically inferior."65
In the early 1950s the AEC was given new priorities under which civilian power reactor development became very important. Atoms For Peace, the U.S.-Euratom bilateral accord, and Shippingport were all a result of a new desire that the United States win the race for nuclear power and that its technology should spread throughout the world. Within the country, however, only light water was sufficiently developed to be the standard bearer.
Within the United States, the early years of reactor development were under control of the AEC. Throughout the fifties, based on a continual series of cost estimates and projections, the AEC had a fluid opinion about which technology was best and shifted its research program accordingly. Military demands, however, resulted in considerable work on light water. In 1954, when priorities changed, security decisions demanded an immediate payoff. The potential for using the first generating station as a way of learning about different technologies 564 Cowan was sacrificed to the need for a reliable reactor.66 Because of the experience on submarines, there was confidence in light water's reliability, though not in its ability to produce inexpensive power, even in the long run. At the same time, foreign policy called for the spread of U.S. technology, and again there was a bias toward immediate payoff. This was less conscious than the Shippingport decision, but part of spreading U.S. technology involved building demonstration plants, and only light water was sufficiently advanced.
By 1962 light water had a large head start over all other technologies, with the exception of gas graphite. The latter was being pursued seriously only in the United Kingdom, and its demise was detailed earlier. Good results early on with light water, combined with the problems of other technologies that had been tried, enhanced the relative position of light water in the beliefs of the decision makers. Westinghouse and General Electric, fearing the advent of a new and better technology, adopted a successful loss-leader, pre-emptive strategy. They are effectively the only reactor designers in the United States, and the descendants of their technologies are the only ones currently being built in Europe.
THE UNITED STATES AFTER 1960
The nuclear power reactor market in the United States after the early 1960s can be seen as the tail end of an increasing returns process. If one technology, in advance of its competitors, makes a large movement along its learning curve, the others will be hard pressed to compete, finding it difficult if not impossible to enter the market. The first technology to get significantly ahead of its rivals is likely to dominate the market.
By the early 1960s General Electric and Westinghouse had amassed considerable technical expertise in nuclear technology, almost all of it using light water technology. Their work for the navy and to a lesser extent their work in Europe had given them enough experience to feel that they had a product for which the market was ready.67 They thought that there were huge profits to be made in nuclear energy but that a great deal of learning was necessary before the costs would be brought down enough to make it competitive with conventional energy. They had other concerns as well:
We had a problem like a lump of butter sitting in the sun. If we couldn't get orders out of the utility industry, with every tick of the clock it became progressively more likely I Recall that the Atomic Energy Commission wanted to do more research before building Shippingport but was overridden.
67 By the end of 1960, 13 nuclear ships had been launched, and a further 33 were under construction. The two firms had completed or begun construction on eight power reactors in Europe and the United States.
